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Introduction: New Technology, Old Challenges
In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.
-Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger Spectacular images of precision-guided munitions as they unerringly, or so perceived, found their way to the target, vividly portray airpower at the dawn of the third millennium. More significantly, these images reveal an increasingly precise and lethal form of airpower. Now, more than ever, airpower is capable of inducing specific effects that span the tactical to strategic spectrum.
Two operational art elements underpin this transformation toward an increasingly lethal and effective form of airpower. The first is technological advance and the advent of precision-guided munitions and stealth. The second and less evident element underpinning airpower effectiveness is targeting. 1 According to Larry Weaver and Robert Pollock's article, "Campaign Planning for the 21 st Century," targeting is the element at the very heart of operational art. 2 The focus of this paper is on the health of this vital operational art element, specifically fixed targeting.
This paper examines the hypothesis that targeting represents a weak link in the effective application of airpower. The objective is to examine the evolution of targeting and determine how effectively has the U.S. Air Force incorporated the discipline of targeting into its vision, doctrine and infrastructure underpinning practice.
The Contextual Significance
In short, the historical struggle for airpower effectiveness represents a struggle to target. Today, the greatest airpower challenge remains the ability to target the enemy. 
Road Map
To answer these questions, I begin by defining targeting as an analytic process at the heart of aerospace power. Targeting translates strategic and operational objectives into strategic and operational effects to achieve political and military objectives. As such, targeting has always been effects-based. The objective of this tutorial is to emphasize targeting's pivotal role in the application of aerospace power.
In order to narrow the scope of the paper, the focus is on fixed targeting.
Mobile/time critical targeting is important, yet focuses primarily on fielded forces rather than the classical centers of gravity (COG) such as leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure and population. These are all elements of a modern society that are typically fixed and vulnerable to strategic attack. A mobile targeting emphasis works if you expect your future enemies' COG to be his fielded forces. History has shown that this is not always the case. In addition, a fielded force emphasis tends to handy-cap one of airpower's greatest strengths; its ability to induce effects that span the tactical to strategic spectrum.
Following this brief look at theory, the paper examines historical practice up to the present to determine how effectively the Air Force has incorporated targeting into the practice of airpower employment. The objective is to identify targeting themes, trends and shortfalls affecting the application of airpower by examining the targeting lessons from the World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force.
Building on this historical examination, the paper then assesses how effectively the U.S. Air Force has incorporated the discipline of targeting into its current doctrine and infrastructure. The conclusion reached is that the Air Force commitment to this vital operational art element continues to lack direction and falls short in the requisite infrastructure underpinning effective practice. Simply put, targeting is identifying and influencing an adversary's vital centers of gravity, in the most efficient manner, to induce specific effects supporting the commander's campaign objectives. In this respect, targeting translates strategic and operational objectives into strategic and operational effects. Targeting has never been about the mere destruction of targets. Rather, destruction is only one effect within a range of desired outcomes. 1 Targeting uses lethal and non-lethal means to obtain direct effects against targets in order to achieve direct and indirect effects at the operational and strategic levels. The goal is to attain control over the systems that underpin an adversary's power and influence.
2 In turn, control enables us to compel an adversary to act in a manner that is in accordance with our objectives. 3 Viewed from this perspective, targeting involves analyzing causality mechanisms and their effects.
Targeting Defines Causal Mechanisms and Effects
The concept of causal mechanisms involves understanding cause and effect
relationships. An example of this concept is direct and indirect effects. Direct effects are immediate. A direct effect results from actions with no intervening effect or mechanism between the original act and the associated outcome. 4 For example, the direct outcome of destroying a bridge is a severed transportation route.
In contrast, an indirect effect is an outcome created via an intermediate effect or
mechanism. These effects can be physical or psychological. 5 Indirect effects are often delayed outcomes that can be difficult to recognize. For example, the indirect effect of destroying a bridge is that the bridge may contain fiber optic cables that support a number of adversary command, control and communications functions. The bridge may also support sewage pipes that are now dumping sewage into the river below creating an environmental effect. Finally, the bridge may have supported a fuel pipeline vital to front-line forces. In time, the severed pipeline will restrict the movement of fielded forces. Thus, indirect effects not only have secondary order effects but also may lead to third, fourth, and higher order effects. Higher order effects can be difficult to assess and may act positively or negatively upon campaign objectives.
In summary, targeting is a discipline that is concerned with causal mechanisms and their effects. As such, targeting underpins airpower strategy in that it applies the concepts of causality and effects in order to link ends, ways and means. How does this work in the targeting process?
Aerospace Strategy and the Targeting Process
Strategy is a decision-making process connecting the ends (objectives) sought with the ways (courses of action) and means (resources) of achieving those ends. 6 Similarly, the targeting discipline is a decision-making process that connects the ends sought with the ways (direct and indirect effects) and means (tools of influence) of achieving those ends. As such, targeting underpins aerospace strategy implementation.
The targeting process is a six-step iterative process or cycle starting with objectives and guidance derivation, then target analysis/development, weaponeering, force application, execution, and combat assessment. 7 Let us examine each step starting with objectives.
Targeting begins with an end state in mind and a broad concept of how to reach that end state as defined by the commander's objectives and guidance. The Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) objectives driving the air campaign are derived from theater level objectives and intent. Theater objectives are in-turn derived from national level objectives. This strategy to task formulation process ensures unity of command and action within the joint force.
Next, the target analysis/development and weaponeering steps of the targeting cycle devise the ways and means to create the desired operational and strategic level effects necessary to meet campaign objectives. Target analysis/development identifies target systems, their components and interrelationships. The aim of target development and weaponeering is to determine the best way to influence vital systems to achieve the desired effect. The output is a prioritized, effects-based target list linked to lethal and non-lethal means.
The fourth step of the targeting process, force application, uses the information generated above to determine the best force to implement the targeting course of action. 8 Specifically, the force application step synergistically orchestrates the weapon systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and other supporting assets in time and space to achieve the objectives. The Air Tasking Order captures the overall plan, which the units execute; the fifth step in the targeting cycle.
The sixth and final step in the targeting cycle is combat assessment. Combat assessment (CA) evaluates performance based on measures of effectiveness. As T. W.
Beagle writes in his thesis, "Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty Promise?," mission success is more than just a tally of sorties launched and weapons delivered.
"Every strike prompts a series of questions such as-was the target hit? If so, did hitting the target achieve the desired effects and, if so, did the desired effects meet the stated objective?" 9 Measures of effectiveness are those metrics, we believe, provide measurable and meaningful insight into gauging the vector and velocity of our strategy's progress.
The output of CA should be an assessment of delivery results, higher order effects, and strategy effectiveness. 10 This assessment process in-turn drives strategy modifications, priorities, force employment, and munitions selection/development.
Summary
In summary, the discipline of targeting underpins air campaign strategy implementation by linking ends, ways, and means. In addition, it provides a feedback- 5 Ibid., 107. 6 During my International Relations course at Air Command and Staff College, I began to conceptualize strategy as a decision-making process that links the ends (objectives) sought with the ways (courses of action) and means (resources) to achieve those ends. 7 data. This is particularly true for the effective employment of precision guided munitions. Precision weapons require more accurate data to be employed effectively, specifically in the area of imagery for laser-guided weapons. According to GWAPS, the availability of this type of data and particularly target materials (i.e., imagery) was a problem throughout the war. 
Operation Allied Force
Targeting during Operation Allied Force (OAF) was a hot political topic and a source of friction within the NATO alliance. In addition, a lack of political objectives and direction complicated the targeting process. Still, OAF recorded many of the same targeting lessons identified in previous wars.
For example, even when the political process stated clear military objectives and allowed targeteers and planners to select targets, target selection required extensive intelligence data, much of which was not readily available. 33 This experience echoes the lessons of earlier practitioners who concluded that target intelligence collection and analysis must begin well before the conflict starts.
Similarly, the organizational structure and processes essential to air campaign planning were initially inadequate. According to a well-placed four-star general, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) was a "pick-up team with ad hoc training."
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In fact, there was no strategy cell or targeting process at work in the CAOC until after the first month plus of OAF. 35 Without these basic organizational elements, the CAOC could not develop a cohesive targeting strategy or measure its effectiveness.
The Kosovo After Action Report identified additional targeting areas for improvement. Specifically, the report called for improvements in federated target development and CA tactics, techniques and procedures. 36 This is an important recommendation given the difficulties of orchestrating a decentralized, multi-agency targeting community. The targeting process requires extensive peacetime preparation and the establishment and testing of organizational structures and standardized processes.
You have to think, exercise and improve targeting capabilities on a daily basis.
On the training front, it appears that the CAOC initially suffered from a lack of trained targeteers. The after action report does not mention this, however, discussions with an Air Force Intelligence General officer indicate it was an issue. Specifically, this
General officer articulated a plan following OAF to shorten the Air Force targeting course. When asked why, the general stated it was necessary to increase the number of courses in order to increase the pool of targeteers, thus avoiding the availability problem during OAF. 37 The effect most likely would be decreased quality. What is the bottom line of this historical examination?
Summary: Enduring Themes, Shortfalls and Trends
The history of airpower represents a struggle to target. This theme pervades the past eighty years of airpower. Surprisingly, we have repeatedly recorded the same lessons. This trend of lessons recorded, yet not learned or acted upon, represents a weak link in the application of airpower that poses operational risk.
In each of the cases discussed, a common theme was a lack of targeting preparation. For a targeting effort to be effective, it must start before a conflict begins.
The full impact of this lack of preparation is not operationally evident, because the nature of the conflicts examined has mitigated the impact of our limited peacetime preparation.
In all cases discussed, except Korea, targeting efforts had the luxury of time to prepare. 
Targeting Doctrine
Doctrine is a statement of the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. 3 According to AFDD-1, "Air Force doctrine is meant to codify accumulated wisdom and provide a framework for the way we prepare for, plan, and conduct air and space operations. house, yet no single entity is responsible for integrating the parts into a cohesive structure. The effect is a compromise in airpower effectiveness.
Second, without a published doctrine articulating the wisdom of experience and a framework for identifying vital centers, how to influence those centers, and assess effectiveness, practice will continue to be governed by ad hoc arrangements. 6 This ad hoc, pick-up team approach will lead to operational and strategic decision-making based on intuition and hope rather than critical analysis. 7 Finally, according to Col Fontenot of the Air Force Doctrine Center, service doctrine should drive joint doctrine. 8 Given the Air Force does not have its own house in order, it is unlikely it will be able to effectively influence joint targeting doctrine. In the next year, the joint community will publish targeting doctrine that may drive our service.
This in itself is an indication we are lagging the fight.
In summary, targeting doctrine is nonexistent. In 1940, the Air Corps had a public relations division but did not possess a target intelligence division. 
Practice
Practice embodies the application of operational art. 10 The effective application of the operational art of targeting must rest firmly on a coordinated, robust and wellexercised infrastructure. This infrastructure includes target analysis and materials production, organization, training, tools, and TTPs. In short, the infrastructure underpinning practice is in disrepair despite recent bright spots in organizational reform.
Target Analysis/Production
Today the target analysis and production community is a decentralized federation composed of numerous organizations and agencies responsible for target analysis and target materials production. The organizations include the Joint Staff, DIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), theater JICs and Services. This organizational structure poses an interesting leadership dilemma: who is in charge?
According to an interview with Joint Staff Targets (J-2T) the unified commands are driving the train.
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According to an interview with JICPAC's Operations
Applications Directorate (JICPAC/OA), this is problematic. One impact of this leadership situation is a lack of standardization in target materials production between the unified commands. 12 This becomes an issue when one unified command is operating in a supporting role to another command. In the end, airpower suffers.
Organization
On the organizational front, the Air Force is currently experiencing a reformation, which seeks to correct the pick-up team approach to targeting and air campaign planning.
Driving this effort is a new Air Force emphasis on the operational level of war, contrasting with its previous tactical focus. The result is a concerted effort by the Air
Force to identify and transform the AOC into a weapon system. This includes efforts to formalize and standardize the AOC structure throughout the Air Force. The larger part of the puzzle is leading the national intelligence community to exercise the same sense of urgency about targeting as the Air Force is now advocating.
14 As stated by a senior Air Force Intelligence officer, we have to get the national intelligence community to update the intelligence databases upon which our fixed targeting operations depend. 15 This is where the Air Force needs to apply aggressive leadership in concert with putting its own targeting house in order. This aspect of the targeting challenge is fundamental to the success of airpower.
Training
On the training front, the Air Force has struggled to recover from the total neglect and collapse of its target training infrastructure. As recent as the summer of 2001, the leadership sought to expand the number of intelligence officers who attend the USAF Targeting Course. 16 Unfortunately, the approach initially advocated was to reduce the length of the course to increase the throughput. This mediocrity over excellence approach is not the answer. According to a pilot serving a career broadening tour in intelligence, no matter where I fly the standards are the same, not true for intelligence. It appears to be different in every command. 18 Within the Air Force this is a problem as well. As the AOC is weaponized, standard TTPs will need to be in place upon which to evaluate an AOCs performance.
Findings and Conclusions
This paper set out to examine how effectively the Air Force has incorporated the discipline of targeting into its doctrine and infrastructure underpinning practice. In general, the history of airpower represents a struggle to target. This struggle continues today and is evident in the Air Force's marginal commitment to a cohesive targeting theory, doctrine and practice.
On the theoretical level, the Air Force lacks a strategic targeting vision that articulates a critical path plan connecting the numerous proscriptive and descriptive target theories to the infrastructure underpinning practice. Historically this shortfall in vision manifested itself in a lack of target preparation. As shown a targeting effort must start before a conflict for it to be effective. Vision is crucial.
Air Force Doctrine reflects this lack of vision. Without a concerted effort by the Air Force to codify the wisdom and frameworks for identifying vital centers, how to influence those centers and assess effectiveness, practice will likely be governed by ad hoc arrangements. This approach will continue to drive operational and strategic decision-making based on intuition and hope rather than critical analysis. The higher order effects of building without a formalized blueprint is the current disjointed infrastructure supporting practice. Following the Cold War, the global security environment has become much more dynamic. In the past, we were concerned with a few players in a relatively stable global environment. In that environment, we could focus our targeting efforts. Today, there are numerous players and threats. The players confronting us range from major powers and rogue states to transnational terrorists and criminal organizations. Consequently, the targeting challenge has increased in both scope and complexity.
Second, the proliferation of technology has allowed potential adversaries access to advanced weapons and information that vastly expands the scope, the timing and tempo of threat capabilities. In this environment, the classic phases of conflict--deter, deploy, halt, build-up, engage, and reconstitute--are now compressed. The U.S. will no longer have the luxury of time to address operational targeting shortfalls on the fly.
Finally, potential enemies are leveraging technology to employ anti-access strategies that threaten U.S. freedom from attack and freedom to act in a given region.
These strategies employ weapons such as mobile medium range ballistic missiles, antiship missiles, UAVs, information warfare and advanced surface to air missile systems.
The implications for targeting are two fold. First, there is an increased emphasis and requirement to conduct mobile targeting to halt advancing enemy forces. Second, the proliferation of threats ranging from major powers and rogue states to transnational criminal and terrorist organizations vastly complicates the scope and complexity of the fixed targeting problem.
In this environment, airpower must be prepared to dominate the time dimension by rapidly creating physical and psychological shock. We must quickly gain access to a given region to facilitate the delivery of operational effects in order to thwart an antiaccess strategy and obtain operational and strategic effects. Mobile targeting focuses primarily on fielded forces rather than the classical centers of gravity (COG): leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure and population.
These are all elements of a modern society or organization that are typically fixed and subject to influence through strategic attack. Even mobile systems themselves are often dependent on a fixed infrastructure that includes support facilities, energy systems, command, control, intelligence, and movement networks.
In conclusion, airpower's ability to induce effects that span the tactical to strategic spectrum demands a robust targeting infrastructure grounded in an Air Force targeting vision, and doctrine. Currently, the Air Force lacks an overarching targeting vision and blueprint to construct this reality. Without a targeting vision, the doctrinal blueprint, and vital infrastructure underpinning practice, airpower targeting will likely continue to be a major source of operational risk. This level of risk may cause airpower to fail to reach the full potential envisioned by its leaders. As history has taught us, a truly effective targeting program must begin before the fighting starts. In contrast to early airpower history, the current focal point for improving effects-based airpower employment lies largely outside the realm of technology. 
